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PRIVATE PROSECUTION: A REMEDY FOR DISTRICT
ATTORNEYS' UNWARRANTED INACTION
"[N]o stronger or more effectual guarantee can be provided for the due
observance of the law of the land, by all persons under all circumstances,
than is given by the power, conceded to everyone by the English system,
of testing the legality of any conduct of which he disapproves, either on
private or on public grounds, by a criminal prosecution." 1 STEPHEN,
HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 496 (1883).
DISTRICT attorneys are required by statute to prosecute all matters of state
concern.' But since mechanical enforcement of all criminal laws is undesirable
and impractical,2 the district attorney is accorded extensive discretion in the
selection of criminals and crimes to prosecute.3 The decision not to prosecute
can be implemented by mere inaction,4 acceptance of a compromise plea,5 or
1. A typical statute provides: "The prosecuting attorney shall commence and pros-
ecute all civil and criminal actions in [his county] . . . in which the county or state
may be concerned . . . ." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 56.060 (Vernon 1949). A few codes specify
the prosecutor's duties with more imperative language. For example, IowA CODE ANN.
§ 336.2 (1946) prescribes: "It shall be the duty of the county attorney to . . . diligently
enforce ... all the laws of the state . .. ."
2. Society's interests are frequently better served by warning than by prosecuting;
obsolete laws should not be enforced. See Snyder, The District Attorney's Hardest Task,
30 3. CRI. L. & C.rMINOLOGY 167, 168 (1939). In Commonwealth v. Dawson, 3 Pa. Dist.
603, 604 (1894), the court commended the district attorney for refraining from prosecut-
ing and added: "[Public welfare] . .. may be advanced as much sometimes by leniency as
by harshness, and a repetition of the offense may be more certainly prevented by with-
holding rather than inflicting punishment." The district attorney's decision to prosecute
depends on the effect of the offense on the community, the means and time available in
relation to other duties, the probability of accomplishing any practical results, and many
other factors. See State ex teL Bourg v. Marreo, 132 La. 109, 61 So. 136 (1913) ; Gould
v. Parker, 114 Vt. 186, 42 A.2d 416 (1945). In addition, the limited capacity of available
judicial machinery requires selection of offenses for trial. See Sly, California Judicial
Council in Full Swing, 11 J. Aas. JuD. Soc'Y 9 (1927) ; The Judicial Council at Work, 1
CALIF. BJ. 138 (1927); LAw ASSOCIATION OF PHILADELPHIA, REPORT OF THE CRIMES
SURVEY COMMISSION 408 (1926).
3. E.g., People ex rel. Schreiner v. Courtney, 380 Ill. 171, 43 N.E.2d 982 (1942) ; Engle
v. Chipman, 51 Mich. 524, 16 N.W. 886 (1883); Commonwealth v. Nicely, 130 Pa. 261, 18
Atl. 737 (1889); ILLINOIS ASSOCIATION FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ILLINOIS CRIME SURVEY
270 (1929). "Arbitrary," "absolute" and "almost boundless" have been used to characterize
the district attorney's discretion. Guiseppe v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1944) ;
Rowan v. Shawneetown, 378 Ill. 289, 38 N.E.2d 2 (1941) ; Brethorst v. Wylie, 205 Ill. App.
72 (1917). See also Attorney General v. Tufts, 239 Mass. 458, 132 N.E. 322 (1921) ; Gould
v. Parker, 114 Vt. 186, 42 A.2d 416 (1945) ; MOLEY, THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL
JusTIcE IN MISsOURI 20-21 (1926); Baker, The Prosecutor-Initiation of Prosecution,
23 J. CRrm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 770 (1933) ; Caldwell, How to Make Prosecuting Effectual,
16J. Am. JUD. Soc'y 73, 75 (1932).
4. Baker and DeLong have commented that the most frequent exercise of the prose-
cutor's discretion arises in decisions not to prosecute at all. Baker, supra note 3; Baker
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entry of a nolle prosequi.6 However, corruption, political ambition,7 or insuffi-
ciency of funds and personnel -often motivate district attorneys to use these
techniques to excess. Such abuse of the district attorney's discretion has created
a substantial deficiency in criminal law enforcement. 9 The United States
& De Long, The Prosecuting Attorney-Power and Duties in Criminal Prosecution, 24 J.
CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1025, 1064 (1934). The incidence of unprosecuted crime was
dramatized by the four reports of the Kefauver Crime Committee. Special Committee to
Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, Interim Report, S. REP. No. 2370,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) ; id., Second Interim Report, S. REP. No. 141, 82d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1951) ; id., Third Interim Report, S. REP. No. 307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951) ; id.,
Final Report, S. REP. No. 725, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951) (hereinafter cited as Kefauver
Committee Reports). For example, see Kefauver Committee Second Interim Report 3,
26; Kefauver Committee Third Interim Report 2, 6, 34, 68, 84, 106-09, 181-82.
5. Through the compromise plea, crimes such as robbery, burglary and rape are re-
duced to petty larceny, assault and battery, and contributing to the delinquency of a minor.
Those who plead guilty to the lesser offense receive as little as thirty days in the county
jail while the crimes committed carry penalties of twenty years to life. Dash, Cracks in
the Foundation of Criminal Justice, 46 ILL. L. REV. 385, 392-93 (1951).
6. At common law, the public prosecutor could enter a nolle prosequi at any time
before the empaneling of the jury or after the return of the verdict. United States v.
Brokaw, 60 F. Supp. 100 (S.D. Ill. 1945). Historically, it was intended for infrequent use;
the contrary result has followed. MOLEY, POLITICS AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 150-53
(1929). See note 7 infra. Most jurisdictions today retain the prosecutor's common law
power to use the nolle. See, e.g., United States v. Brokaw, supra; People ex rel. Attor-
ney General v. District Court, 23 Colo. 466, 48 Pac. 500 (1897) ; Orabona v. Lindscott, 49
R.I. 443, 144 Atl. 52 (1928).
7. POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 185-86 (1929); STEINBERG, CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION IN CONNECTICUT 58 (unpublished manuscript in Yale Law Library 1940);
Hobbs, Prosecutor's Bias, An Occupational Disease, 2 ALA. L. REV. 40, 45-47 (1949);
Kennedy, Local Politics vs. Prosecuting Attorney, 23 J. Am. JuD. SOc'Y 180 (1940) ; Cald-
well, supra note 3, at 74-75. Evidence gathered by the Kefauver Committee indicating cor-
ruption is presented in material cited note 4 supra. Moley contends that use of the prose-
cutor's office as a stepping stone to higher political office is demonstrated by the fact that
42% of the lawyers in Congress in 1914, 1920 and 1924 and in governorships from 1920 to
1924 had been prosecuting attorneys. One prosecutor rose through the political ranks so
rapidly that he was able to exercise the governor's discretion to refuse a pardon to a con-
vict he prosecuted. MOLEY, POLITICS AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 76-79, 157-60 (1929).
8. Over 25% of 151 public prosecutors from 45 states who responded to a Yale Law
Journal questionnaire on prosecution procedures stated that they did not have enough time
or help to conduct necessary prosecutions. These replies to 300 questionnaires circulated
to public prosecutors in all 48 states are on file in the Yale Law Library. Results of this
survey, hereinafter cited as QUESTIONNAIRE, are reported in the text at notes 52, 60, 64,
68, 116, 131 infra.
The prosecutor's pay is low, and often only inexperienced and incompetent men can be
attracted. U.S. NATIONAL CoMMIssIoN ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT
ON PROSECUTION 15 (1931) (hereinafter cited as REPORT ON PROSECUTION); What Is
Wrong With the Prosecutor?, 11 J. AM. JuD. Soc'v 67 (1927). A study of Missouri pros-
ecutors disclosed that most of them ranged in age from 25 to 29 years, and had had from
1 to 4 years' experience at law before election. MoLEY, ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL
JUSTIcE IN MissouRi 21 (1926).
9. Excessive and irresponsible use of the nolle prosequi and compromise plea demon-
strates this deficiency. Surveys of criminal prosecutions in Illinois, Missouri, Georgia and
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National Commission on Law Enforcement concluded that the majority of
suspects are never brought to trial for their alleged crimes even though there
are convincing cases against them.' 0 More recently the Kefauver Crime Com-
mission has charged that prosecutors in general are failing to suppress wide-
spread crime."
Experience has conclusively demonstrated that existing methods for control
of the district attorney's discretion are inadequate. District attorneys may be
removed by courts, governors, legislatures and voters, 12 but these restraints
Cleveland disclose excessive use of the nolle prosequi. ILLINOIS ASSOCIATION FOR CRIIMINAL
JUSTICE, ILLINOIS CRIME SURVEY 269-72 (1929) ; MissouI ASSOCIATION FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, MISSOURI CRIME SURVEY 274, 276 (1926); Crine and the Georgia Courts,
16 J. CRnm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 169 (1925); CLEVELAND FOUNDATION SURVEY, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND 142-46 (1922). The California Crime Commission reported that
compromise of criminal cases creates serious law enforcement problems. CALIFORNIA CRIME
CoImnissIoN REPORT 27 (1929). The U.S. National Cominission reported on the basis of
these and other surveys that methods for selecting cases to prosecute were haphazard and
careless. REPORT ON PROSECUTION, op. cit. supra note 8, at 100. The persistent excessive
use of the nolle and compromise plea was demonstrated by statistics disclosing that for over
a quarter of a century in Chicago, 22% of all indictments were disposed of by waiving the
felony and prosecuting on a lesser included charge. MOLEY, POLICs AND CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION 183 (1929). Statistics compiled in CLARK & SHULMAN, LAw ADmxNIs-
T RATION IN COxNECrcUcT, table cxvI, insert at 188 (1937), disclose widespread use of
the nolle prosequi.
Figures of a more recent vintage substantiate these statistics. A study of criminal pros-
ecutions in the Municipal Court of Chicago for 1948, 1949 and 1950 revealed that approxi-
mately 32% of all felony cases are disposed of by the nolle and about 34% by the lesser
plea. Dash, supra note 5, at 392.
The small percentage of apprehended suspects brought to trial led one observer to quip
that if Ali Baba and his forty thieves were caught in the United States, only six would
be prosecuted. John M. Love, quoted in MOLEY, op. cit. supra, at 27.
10. REPORT ON PROSECUTION, op. cit. supra note 8, at 11.
11. Kefauver Committee Third Interim Report 67-68, 181; Kefauver Committee Final
Report 42-76.
12. For state statutes authorizing judicial removal of the prosecutor, see, e.g., MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 94-5516 (1947); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-1-9 (1953); OHIO GEN. CODE
ANN. § 291 (1951.). Also see, De Long & Baker, The Prosecuting Attorney-Provisons
of Law Organizing the Office, 23 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 926, 953-54 (1933). In
Attorney General v. Pelletier, 240 Mass. 264, 134 N.E. 407 (1922), and Attorney General
v. Tufts, 239 Mass. 458, 132 N.E. 322 (1921), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
removed district attorneys under the provisions of MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 211, § 4 (1951).
Analogous power is vested in New Jersey Superior Court justices through their authority
to require the attorney general to supersede the prosecutor of the pleas in the county
courts. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:17A-4f (1955). A predecessor of this statute was applied
in State ex rel. O'Reardon v. Wilson, 4 N.J. Misc. 1008, 135 Atl. 280 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
Other state statutes grant the governor power to remove public prosecutors. E.g., MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 351.03 (West 1947) ; N.Y. CONST. art. 9, § 5; Wis. STAT. § 17.11 (1953).
Removal of the public prosecutor by the governor was upheld in State ex rel. Hardee v.
Allen, 126 Fla. 878, 172 So. 222 (1937) ; State ex rel. Kinsella v. Eberhart, 116 Minn. 313,
133 N.W. 857 (1911).
On a recommendation of the attorney general, two-thirds of the Maryland Senate may
remove a state's attorney. MD. CONsT. art. 5, § 7. In Tennessee, the district attorney may
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are ineffective to control abuses of discretion. The district attorney need fear
ouster only for criminal activity, and even where evidence of such conduct
exists, ouster proceedings are seldom employed.'3 Similarly, the authority of
state officials to supersede the local prosecutor has rarely been exercised.
1
4
This method of restraint merely places the ultimate opportunity for action with
other, busier, more remote officials.'0 Even when confronted with evidence of
flagrant inaction by local prosecutors, state officials have not used their powers
of supersedure. 16 The prosecutor's domination of the grand jury and his power
be impeached whenever a majority of the House of Representatives believes he is guilty
of a crime. TENN. CODE ANN. § 11864 (Williams 1934).
Twelve states have provisions for recall of the public prosecutor. De Long & Baker,
The Prosecuting Attorney-Provisions of Law Organizing the Office, 23 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 926, 954 (1933).
13. See MOLEY, POLITICS AND CRVAINAL PROSECUTION 144 (1929); De Long & Baker,
The Prosecuting Attorney--Provisions of Law Organizing the Office, 23 J. CRISI. L. &
CRMINoLoY 926, 957, 963 (1933). Binkley, The Prosecuting Attorney in Ohio-An Ob-
solete Office, 18 NAT'L M UIc. REv. 569, 572 (1929), succinctly characterizes the prose-
cutor's security: "If he is merely lazy or utterly incompetent, his position is simply impreg-
nable." See also Caldwell, How To Make Prosecuting Effectual, 16 J. Ams. JUD. Soc'v
73, 75-76 (1932).
14. Many jurisdictions permit state officials to supersede the district attorney. Several
states have expressly given the attorney general and the local prosecutor concurrent juris-
diction to conduct criminal actions. E.g., CAL. CoxsT. art. V, § 21; CAL. CODE Gov. § 12550
(1951) ; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:23 (West 1951) ; NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-204 (1943). Many
jurisdictions give the attorney general authority to supervise the local prosecuting attor-
ney. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 13.2(7) (1946) ; N.H. Rav. LAWS c. 24, § 5 (1942) ; WASH.
REV. CODE § 43.10.090 (1951). Under such statutes the attorney general has conducted
criminal prosecutions. Mundy v. McDonald, 216 Mich. 444, 185 N.W. 877 (1921) ; State
ex rel. Nolan v. District Court, 22 Mont. 25, 55 Pac. 916 (1899) ; State ex rel. Miller v.
District Court, 19 N.D. 819, 124 N.W. 417 (1910). Several states authorize the attorney
general to supersede the local prosecutor at the request of the governor. E.g., N.Y. ExEc.
§ 63(2) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 260 (1955) ; People v. Gibson, 53 Colo. 231, 125 Pac. 531
(1912); State v. Bowles, 70 Kan. 821, 79 Pac. 726 (1905). The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has held that the attorney general has a common law power to supersede the local
prosecutor. Margiotti Appeal, 365 Pa. 330, 75 A.2d 465 (1950) ; Commonwealth ex rel.
Minerd v. Margiotti, 325 Pa. 17, 188 Atl. 524 (1936). The attorney general's power to
conduct criminal prosecutions has been carried to its logical conclusion in the formation of
the California State Department of Justice. For discussion of this Department, see Beasley,
California Unifies Enforcement Agencies to Fight Crime, 20 A.B.A.J. 757 (1934) ; War-
ren, A State Department of Justice, 21 A.B.A.J. 495 (1935).
15. For criticism of the attorney general's effectiveness in criminal prosecutions, see
De Long, Powers and Duties of the State Attorney-General in Criminal Prosecution, 25
J. CRru. L. & CRIMIN6LOGY 358, 397-99 (1934); Bettman, Centralization of State Prose-
cuting Agencies, 1 Ohio Op. 223 (1934).
16. The Kefauver Committee reported numerous instances where state officials failed
to take action to enforce the law. Despite widespread crime around New Orleans Parish,
state officials refused to act. Kefauver Committee Third Interim Report 84-90. In Louisiana,
the attorney general can supersede district attorneys. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:23 (West
1951). The Committee condemned Governor Fuller Warren of Florida for reinstating the
sheriff of Dade County without a full investigation. Kefauver Committee Third Interim
Report 36. Governor Warren was further criticized for not responding to pleas to suppress
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to nolle its indictments preclude those jurors from making effective inroads on
his discretionary decisions."1 Direct communication with the grand jury by
private complainants is prohibited in most states,' 8 and even where permitted,
it is discouraged in some states by the threat of a contempt citation for wasting
the jury's time.19 Aroused public opinion has been unable to induce prosecu-
tion even where law enforcement is outrageously inadequate.20
Existing judicial restraints have also proved ineffective.21 Courts consistent-
ly refuse to issue a mandamus to compel criminal prosecutions, 22 since the
gambling in Hollywood, Florida. Kefauver Committee Final Report 75. Under FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 27.14 (1943), the governor may replace the state's attorney. The Mississippi Gov-
ernor refused to take any action against "wide open" gambling in Harrison County, Missis-
sippi, when petitioned by local citizens. Kefauver Committee Third Interim Report 84.
Open and notorious gambling in New York and New Jersey was also reported. Kefauver
Committee Second Interin Report 3; Kefauver Committee Third Interim Report 106-08.
No action was taken by state officials although they had the power to do so. N.Y. EXEc.
§ 63(2); N.Y. CousT. art. 9, § 5; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2:182-1 (1939).
The Kefauver Committee suggested that state officials as well as local prosecutors are
susceptible to corrupt influences. The Committee termed testimony given by Missouri's
Governor Smith about his connection with racketeers as "simply not credible." Kefauver
Committee Third Interim Report 40. A report made by Governor Dewey's counsel and
submitted to the Committee was labeled false. Id. at 108. Governor Fuller Warren of
Florida was frequently criticized for questionable activities in relation to law enforcement.
Kefauver Comnittee Final Report 76. Also see note 20 infra. The Committee further
indicated that the California State Department of Justice was used to organize a system of
statewide gambling protection with the apparent blessing of the attorney general. Kefauver
Committee Second Interim Report 26-27.
17. See Brack v. Wells, 184 Md. 86, 40 A.2d 319 (1944); MOLEY, POLITICS AND
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 50, 127 (1929) ; Binkley, The Prosecuting Attorney im Ohio-A
Obsolete Office, 18 NAT'L MuNic. REV. 569, 571. (1929) ; note 6 supra.
18. Charge To Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. 992, No. 18255 (C.C.D. Cal. 1872) ; McCul-
lough v. Commonwealth, 67 Pa. 30 (1870) ; State v. Love, 23 Tenn. 255 (1843). Contra,
In re Lester, 77 Ga. 143 (1886).
19. People v. Parker, 374 Ill. 524, 30 N.E.2d 11 (1940) ; Hitzelberger v. State, 173
Md. 435, 196 Atl. 288 (1938) ; Commonwealth y. McNary, 246 Mass. 46, 140 N.E. 255
(1923).
20. An aroused public was unable to induce action by public prosecutors in Miami,
Hollywood or Tampa, Florida, Covington, Kentucky, Harrison County, Mississippi, or in
the New Orleans, Louisiana area. Kefauver Committee Interim Report 10; Kefauver
Committee Third Interim Report 83-84; Kefauver Committee Final Report 43-44, 75-
76. It is of course not easy to arouse public attention, even where repeated instances
of flagrant abuse have occurred. Openly corrupt prosecutors have on occasion won re-
election. See Attorney General v. Tufts, 239 Mass. 458, 488, 132 N.E. 322 (1921) ; State
v. Graves, 346 Mo. 990, 144 S.W.2d 91 (1940).
21. Most jurisdictions consider the public prosecutor's discretion to be beyond the
court's control. E.g., United States v. Brokaw, 60 F. Supp. 100 (S.D. Ill. 1945); State
ex tel. Spencer v. Criminal Court, 214 Ind. 551, 15 N.E.2d 1020 (1938) ; Wilson v. County,
257 Ill. App. 220 (1930). Contra, Ex parte Hayter, 16 Cal. App. 211, 116 Pac. 370 (191.1);
Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney-General v. Hipple, 69 Pa. 9 (1881).
22. In dicta the courts often suggest that a public prosecutor may be compelled to act,
but petitions to force criminal prosecution are nevertheless refused. Patten v. Dennis, 134
F.2d 137 (9th Cir. 1943) ; Ackerman v. Houston, 45 Ariz. 293, 43 P.2d 194 (1935) ; Brack
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impossibility of following the district attorney through the case reduces this
device to a futile gesture.23 Efforts to provide judicial supervision of the nolle
prosequi and the compromise plea have failed.24 While judicial power to ap-
point a substitute if the public prosecutor is unavailable or disqualified has
somewhat curtailed the district attorney's discretion, 25 in most states this power
v. Wells, 184 Md. 86, 40 A.2d 319 (1944). In the only reported case where the district
attorney was compelled to prosecute criminally, the mandamus action was instituted by the
attorney general. Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney-General v. Hipple, supra note 21. That
case raises the issue of a state official's power to control the district attorney. See note 14
supra.
However, occasionally mandamus has been issued to compel the district attorney to
perform civil duties. Board of Supervisors v. Simpson, 36 Cal. 2d 671, 227 P.2d 14 (1951)
(mandamus issued to compel the district attorney to abate a nuisance) ; Thomas v. Fuller,
166 La. 847, 118 So. 42 (1928) (mandamus issued to compel the public prosecutor to in-
stitute quo warranto actions) ; State ex rel. Brown v. Warnock, 12 Wash. 2d 478, 122 P.2d
472 (1942) (same) ; State ex rel. Cook v. Richards, 61 S.D. 28, 245 N.W. 901. (1932)
(state's attorney compelled to challenge county commissioner's redistricting of election
units). But the courts are even reluctant to compel public prosecutors to perform civil
duties. See, e.g., Buggelin v. Doe, 8 Ariz. 341, 76 Pac. 458 (1904) ; Vanhoose v. Yingling,
172 Ark. 1009, 291 S.W. 420 (1927) ; People ex rel. Miller v. Fullenwider, 329 Ill. 65, 160
N.E. 175 (1928) ; Herman v. Morlidge, 298 Ky. 632, 183 S.W.2d 807 (1944) ; Everding
v. McGinn, 23 Ore. 15,35 Pac. 178 (1889).
23. Boyne v. Ryan, 100 Cal. 265, 34 Pac. 707 (1893) ; People ex rel. Staats v. Tremain,
29 Barb. 96, 17 How. Pr. 10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1859) ; State ex rel. Rosbach v. Pratt, 6
Wash. 157,122 Pac. 987 (1912).
24. Some states attempted to curtail compromises by requiring the district attorney
to submit his reasons for recommending the lesser plea to the court. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 630.30 (West 1947) ; N.Y. CraiM. CODE § 342(a). Similarly, a minority of jurisdictions
abridged the prosecutor's common law power to enter a nolle by requiring court assent
before it could become final. E.g., People ex rel. Hayne v. Newcomer, 284 Ill. 315, 120
N.E. 244 (1918) ; Halloran v. State, 80 Ind. 586 (1881) (dictum) ; Denham v. Robinson,
72 W. Va. 243, 77 S.E. 970 (1913). In both situations court approval became a mere for-
mality. In REPORT ON PROsECUTioN, op. cit. suPra note 8, at 19, the role of the courts in
supervising the nolle prosequi was evaluated as perfunctory and achieving little. Weintraub
& Tough, Lesser Pleas Considered, 32 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 506, 518-21 (1942), re-
ported the results of a detailed study on the effectiveness of the New York law requiring
the district attorney to submit his reasons and receive court approval before entering a
compromise plea. For the most part routine reasons were given, and in many cases no
reason at all. Weintraub and Tough found that the judiciary plays an insignificant role
in the regulation of compromise pleas. They concluded that the New York statute was not
a deterrent to the acceptance of the compromise plea. Id. at 529.
25. The court's power to appoint a substitute if the public prosecutor is unavailable or
disqualified has been based on inherent or statutory authority or both. E.g., Pelaez v. State,
107 Fla. 50, 144 So. 364 (1932) ; Sayles v. Circuit Judge, 82 Mich. 84, 46 N.W. 29 (1890) ;
State v. Gauthier, 113 Ore. 297, 231 Pac. 141. (1924). The prosecutor has been held to be
unavailable for a variety of reasons. Glavino v. People, 75 Colo. 94, 224 Pac. 225 (1924)
(absent from court sessions) ; White v. Polk County, 17 Iowa 413 (1864) (absent from
the state) ; Territory v. Harding, 6 Mont. 323, 12 Pac. 750 (1887) (absent from the coun-
ty) ; Mahaffey v. Territory, 11 Okla. 213, 66 Pac. 342 (1901) (physically infirm) ; State
v. Smalls, 98 S.C. 297, 82 S.E. 421 (1914) (sickness) ; State v. Smith, 117 W. Va. 598,
186 S.E. 621 (1936) (pressure of other work). Other factors have caused the prosecutor
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cannot be used to remedy failure or refusal to prosecute.2 6 Even where avail-
able,27 replacement for inaction is not adequate because there is no advocate
who can present evidence of improper conduct, challenge the prosecutor's judg-
ment, and assume responsibility for conducting the prosecution if the court
decides to replace the district attorney.
2 8
Supplementing judicial replacement power with private prosecution would
remedy the deficiencies of that restraining technique and provide a practical
method for curtailing abuses of the district attorney's discretion. The core of
this plan is judicial supervision of the prosecutor's discretionary acts. Follow-
ing a showing by a private citizen that the public prosecutor has abused his
discretion through inaction or improper action, the court would have the power
to appoint a privately hired attorney to act as the public prosecutor for a single
action. This plan appears to offer a promising solution to the delicate dilemma
posed by divergent demands for independence and control of the public prose-
cutor.
JUDICIAL REPLACEMENT OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY
Seven jurisdictions currently allow the courts to appoint a substitute prose-
cutor to replace the district attorney for a single criminal action if he fails or
refuses to prosecute.2 9 The Pennsylvania statute also permits substitution if
the prosecutor proceeds improperly.2 0 In two states the constitution is the
source of the replacement power;31 the others rely on statutes or inherent
judicial authority. 2 The few appellate cases involving judicial replacement
to be held disqualified. People v. Walters, 98 Cal. 138, 32 Pac. 864 (1893) (previous ser-
vice by prosecutor as defendant's attorney); People v. Morretti, 349 Ill. App. 67, 109
N.E.2d 915 (1952) (prosecutor appeared in same case as a witness) ; State v. Jones, 306
Mo. 437, 268 S.W. 83 (1924) (simultaneous civil suit between prosecutor and accused) ;
State ex rel. McGrade v. District Court, 52 Mont. 371, 157 Pac. 1157 (1916) (removal pro-
ceedings against prosecutor) ; State ex rel Thomas v. Henderson, 123 Ohio St. 474, 175
N.E. 865 (1931) (prosecutor under investigation).
26. Mahaffey v. Territory, supra note 25; State v. Heaton, 21 Wash. 59, 56 Pac. 843
(1899). Contra, Spaulding v. State, 61 Neb. 289, 85 N.W. 80 (1901).
27. A few states permit courts to replace the district attorney for failure or refusal to
prosecute. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 388.12 (West 1947); N.D. CoDE § 11-1606 (1943); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 3432 (1930) ; TENN. CONST. art. 6, § 5; UTAH CONST. art. 8, § 10;
Taylor v. State, 49 Fla. 69, 38 So. 380 (1905) ; Territory v. Harding, 6 Mont. 323, 12 Pac.
750 (1887) (dictum).
28. Judges feel it is inappropriate for them to become involved as partisans. When
Judge Goodenough of Kenton County, Kentucky, was asked by the Kefauver Committee
why he did not take an active lead in suppressing crime, he replied: "Now my conduct, of
necessity, must be restricted. I am a judge, Sir." Kefauver Committee Final Report 47.
See also Taylor v. State, 49 Fla. 69, 91, 38 So. 380, 387 (1905) (dissenting opinion).
29. See note 27 supra.
30. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 3432 (1930).
31. TENN. CoNsT. art. 6, § 5; UTAH CoNsT. art. 8, § 10.
32. MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 388.12 (West 1.947); N.D. CODE § 11-1606 (1943); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 16, § 3432 (1930) ; Taylor v. State, 49 Fla. 69, 38 So. 380 (1905) ; Territory v.
Harding, 6 Mont. 323, 12 Pac. 750 (1887) (dictum).
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for abusive action or inaction contain little to indicate what factual situations
will justify use of the replacement power. The case law reveals that as a gen-
eral rule the district attorney will be replaced only when there is a vigorous
difference of opinion between court and prosecutor regarding the advisability
of prosecution.2 3 In addition, it has been indicated that the district attorney's
discretionary acts will be rigorously scrutinized if there is some suggestion of
interest on his part.34 But while instances of judicial replacement of the pro-
secutor are infrequent, the case law does provide some indication of both the
constitutionality and limitations on the use of this power.
Constitutionality of the Replacement Power
Statutes authorizing judicial replacement of the district attorney may en-
counter constitutional objections in the thirty-eight states where the office of
the public prosecutor is established or regulated by the state constitution.,3
While the Pennsylvania court has sustained the constitutionality of a replace-
ment statute, 6 the South Dakota court has held that such a statute abridged a
constitutional provision establishing the office of the public prosecutor.3 7 The
North Dakota court has raised the additional objection that grounds for re-
moval of the public prosecutor specified in its constitution are exclusive and
may not be supplemented by statute.38
Constitutional provisions which establish the office of the public prosecutor
pose no real problem where the statute permits replacement only when a district
attorney has abused his discretion. All courts which have considered the duties
of a district attorney have held that his constitutional authority to prosecute
is discretionary.3 9 A necessary corollary of this holding is the proposition that
the right can be enjoyed only so long as the discretion is not abused.-"' There-
fore, whenever a district attorney has abused his discretion in electing not to
prosecute, he is acting beyond the bounds of his authority, whether or not that
authority was vested in him by a constitution. In such a case, the legislative
33. Commonwealth v. Dawson, 3 Pa. Dist. 603 (1894) ; Pippin v. State, 34 Tenn. 43
(1854) ; Moreland v. State ex rel. McCray, 168 Tenn. 145, 76 S.W.2d 319 (1934).
34. Commonwealth v. McHale, 97 Pa. 397 (1881).
35. Thirty-eight state constitutions provide for a prosecuting attorney. While some
constitutions merely contain a mandate to the legislature to establish the office of the public
prosecutor, others provide for his election, term of office, salary, removal and territory
under his jurisdiction. De Long & Baker, The Prosecuting Attorney-Provisions of Law
Organizing the Office, 23 J. Cams. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 926, 928-30 (1933).
36. Commonwealth v. McHale, 97 Pa. 397 (1881).
37. State v. Flavin, 35 S.D. 530,153 N.W. 296 (1915).
38. See State ex rel. Ilvedson v. District Court, 70 N.D. 17, 291 N.W. 620 (1940).
39. E.g., People v. Courtney, 380 Ill. 171, 43 N.E.2d 982 (1942) ; Engle v. Chipman,
51 Mich. 524, 16 N.W. 886 (1883); Commonwealth v. Nicely, 130 Pa. 261, 18 Atl. 737
(1889). See also note 3 supra.
40. Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney-General v. Hipple, 69 Pa. 9 (1881) ; Patten v.
Dennis, 134 F.2d 137 (9th Cir. 1943) (dictum) ; Ackerman v. Houston, 45 Ariz. 293, 43
P.2d 194 (1935) (dictum) ; Brack v. Wells, 184 Md. 86, 40 A.2d 319 (1944) (dictum).
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power to provide for law enforcement can properly be used to permit judges
to replace irresponsible prosecutors. Indeed, some courts have asserted that
they possess inherent power to do this, unaided by statutory authorization. 41
The decisions of the Pennsylvania and South Dakota courts both conform
to this analysis. The Pennsylvania court allowed replacement where a district
attorney abused his discretion, stating that the constitutional provision estab-
lishing the prosecutor's office was a bar only to abolition of the office.4 The
South Dakota court invalidated a replacement statute because the law au-
thorized replacement not only when discretion was abused, but whenever "in
the opinion of the court the ends of justice would be promoted thereby."43
Since this statute allowed replacement without requiring a showing that the
district attorney was acting beyond his constitutionally guaranteed authority,
it was properly held to conflict with the state constitution.
Constitutional provisions which authorize removal of a district attorney for
specified reasons also do not limit the judicial power to replace for abuses of
discretion. Conduct which constitutes an abuse of discretion is still beyond the
authority of a district attorney irrespective of whether he may also be removed
for corruption, habitual drunkenness, incompetency or malfeasance. 44 Clearly
the intent of such provisions was to insure that the grounds enumerated would
be held sufficient to authorize removal, and not to imply that abuse of dis-
cretion was to be tolerated because not specifically proscribed. Furthermore,
provisions declaring "corruption" or "malfeasance" to be grounds for removal
could easily be construed in appropriate cases to include unwarranted inaction
or improper action. Certainly nothing in the wording of these provisions com-
pels invalidation of replacement statutes, and any ambiguity which may exist
should yield to the desirability of upholding a legislative attempt to remedy a
serious public problem.
Limitations on Judicial Replacement Power
Sharp limitations on the procedures for replacing the public prosecutor have
resulted from the courts' unwillingness to question the district attorney's de-
cisions. The prosecutor's discretion has been so broadened that his actions are
accorded a virtually irrebuttable presumption of propriety. Thus it has been
held that a replacement statute may be used only when "circumstances impera-
tively demand.' 45 Other courts have indicated their unwillingness to replace
the district attorney by employing strained rationalizations to deny relief. For
example, the Tennessee court reversed a trial court order which replaced the
41. Taylor v. State, 49 Fla. 69, 38 So. 380 (1905) ; Territory v. Harding, 6 Mont. 323,
12 Pac. 750 (1887) (dictum) ; State ex tel. Clyde v. Lauder, 11. N.D. 136, 90 N.W. 564
(1902).
42. Commonwealth v. McHale, 97 Pa. 397, 406 (1881).
43. State v. Flavin, 35 N.D. 530, 541, 153 N.W. 296, 300 (1925).
44. For constitutional provisions providing removal for such reasons, see OKLA. CoNST.
art. 8, § 1; N.D. CoNsT. § 196; W. Va. CoNST. art. VIII, § 4.
45. Commonwealth v. Dawson, 3 Pa. Dist. 603 (1894).
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public prosecutor under a provision authorizing removal for inaction, because
the lower court based its decision to replace on the prosecutor's "incompetency"
rather than on his conceded "failure to prosecute." 46 Use of the replacement
power has been somewhat further limited by narrow construction of the au-
thorizing statutes. The courts will not accept a mere probability of inaction
or improper conduct, even if the likelihood is extreme ;47 actual failure or re-
fusal to prosecute, or improper action, has invariably been required. In addi-
tion, no replacement can be made unless the prosecutor is given notice and an
opportunity for hearing.
48
While narrow construction of replacement statutes may be justifiable, the
virtually conclusive presumption of propriety now accorded to the district at-
torney's decisions should be abandoned. The extent to which district attor-
neys have abused their discretion demonstrates that this presumption is thor-
oughly unwarranted. And the availability of a practicable replacement plan
makes its continued application unnecessary and undesirable. The success of
such a plan depends on the person who fills the void left by the district attor-
ney's inaction.
THE PRIVATE PROSECUTOR
The private prosecutor is a promising candidate for the job the district attor-
ney has left undone. Expansion of the private citizen's role in criminal law
enforcement is dictated both by his significant experience in American and
foreign criminal law and by the historic policies which have supported his right
to participate.
Private Enforcement of Criminal Law
Despite widespread belief that criminal actions are conducted exclusively by
public officials, 4 9 private prosecutors in fact play an extensive role in criminal
law enforcement. In thirty jurisdictions appellate courts have decided that
privately employed attorneys may assist the public prosecutor,r0 while only
46. Pippin v. State, 34 Tenn. 43 (1854). In some cases a more liberal attitude has been
taken by the appellate courts in presuming that the trial court acted properly in appointing
a substitute prosecutor. State v. Borgstrom, 69 Minn. 508, 72 N.W. 799 (1897) ; Douglass
v. State, 14 Tenn. 525 (1834) ; Turner v. State, 89 Tenn. 547, 15 S.W. 838 (1891).
47. Commonwealth v. Zerby, 29 Pa. County Ct. 363 (Sch. 1931), held that mere prob-
ability that the district attorney would not prosecute because of interest was insufficient to
justify his removal.
48. State ex rel. Ilvedson v. District Court, 70 N.D. 17, 291 N.W. 620 (1940).
49. See, e.g., Note, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 407, 408 (1948); REPo RT oN PROSECUTION, op.
cit. supra note 8, at 7.
50. Handley v. State, 214 Ala. 172, 106 So. 692 (1926); People v. Powell, 87 Cal. 348,
25 Pac. 481. (1891) ; Davis v. People, 77 Colo. 546, 238 Pac. 25 (1925) ; Oglesby v. State,
83 Fla. 132, 90 So. 825 (1922) ; Jackson v. State, 156 Ga. 842, 120 S.E. 535 (1923) ; State
v. Steers, 12 Idaho 174, 85 Pac. 104 (1906) ; People v. Hayner, 213 Ill. 142, 72 N.E. 792
(1904) ; Williams v. State, 188 Ind. 283, 123 N.E. 209 (1919); State v. Helm, 92 Iowa
540, 61 N.W. 246 (1894) ; State v. Wilson, 24 Kan. 189 (1880) ; Bennyfield v. Common-
wealth, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 446, 17 S.W. 271 (1891) ; State v. Petrich, 122 La. 127, 47 So. 438
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three have said that they may not. 1 Moreover, sixty-two per cent of 151 public
prosecutors from forty-five states who responded to a questionnaire on prose-
cution procedures stated that they permit privately hired attorneys to assist in
criminal proceedings.52 Most states find authority for permitting private pros-
ecution in the inherent power of the court to administer justice.53 In some
jurisdictions the power of the public prosecutor to select assistants is used as
the authority for permitting private attorneys to aid in criminal prosecution.
54
A few states have enacted statutes that give private parties the right to hire
assistant prosecutors.5 No restrictions have been established on the crimes
private attorneys may assist in prosecuting.56 The courts have approved of
(1908) ; State v. Bartlett, 105 Me. 212, 74 AtI. 18 (1909) ; State v. Rue, 72 Minn. 296, 75
N.W. 235 (1898); State v. Mathews, 341 Mo. 1121, 111 S.W.2d 62 (1937) ; State v. O'Brien,
35 Mont. 482, 90 Pac. 514 (1907) ; Polin v. State, 14 Neb. 540, 16 N.W. 898 (1883) ; State
v. Hale, 85 N.H. 403, 160 AtI. 95 (1932) ; Gardner v. State, 55 N.J.L. 17, 26 Atl. 30 (Sup.
Ct. 1892) ; State v. Lucero, 20 N.M. 55, 146 Pac. 407 (1915) ; State v. Carden, 209 N.C.
404, 183 S.E. 898 (1936) ; State v. Kent, 4 N.D. 577, 62 N.W. 631 (1895) ; Perry v. State,
84 Okla. Crim. 211, 181 P.2d 280 (1947) ; Commonwealth v. Musto, 348 Pa. 300, 35 A.2d
307 (1944) ; Chambers v. State, 22 Tenn. 237 (1842) ; Burkhard v. State, 18 Tex. App. 599
(1885) ; People v. Tidwell, 4 Utah 506, 12 Pac. 61 (1886) ; State v. Ward, 61 Vt. 153, 17
Atl. 483 (1888); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 107, 30 S.E. 452 (1898); State v.
Hoshor, 26 Wash. 643, 67 Pac. 386 (1901) ; State v. Lohm, 97 W. Va. 652, 125 S.E. 758
(1924).
51. Massachusetts, Michigan and Wisconsin have generally refused to permit private
attorneys to assist in criminal prosecutions. Commonwealth v. Williams, 56 Mass. 582
(1849) (dictum) ; Meister v. People, 31 Mich. 99 (1875) ; Biemel v. State, 71 Wis. 444, 37
N.W. 244 (1888). However, even in those states there have been exceptions where the
private attorney participated in a limited manner or was not hired by interested parties.
Commonwealth v. Herman, 253 Mass. 516, 149 N.E. 198 (1925) (no reversible error if a
private attorney occupies the district attorney's trial table to confer with the prosecutor) ;
Commonwealth v. Knapp, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 477 (1830) (conviction approved since the
private assistant, Daniel Webster, was a volunteer and received no compensation from any
interested party) ; People v. Schick, 75 Mich. 592, 42 N.W. 1008 (1889) (privately hired
attorney permitted to ask a few questions and argue a motion to quash the indictment) ;
People v. Bemis, 51 Mich. 422, 16 N.W. 794 (1883) (Board of County Commissioners
permitted to hire a private prosecutor) ; Scheldberger v. State, 204 Wis. 235, 235 N.W. 419
(1931) (investigation and taking statements from witnesses by a private attorney are
proper).
52. QUESTIONNAIRE. See note 8 supra.
53. Hayner v. People, 213 Ill. 142, 72 N.E. 792 (1904) ; Williams v. State, 188 Ind.
283, 123 N.E. 209 (1919); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 107, 30 S.E. 452 (1898).
54. State v. Bartlett, 105 Me. 212, 74 Atl. 18 (1909) ; State v. O'Brien, 35 Mont. 482,
90 Pac. 514 (1907).
55. Under K.AN. GEN. STAT. § 19-717 (1949), counsel hired by the prosecuting witness
on any type of action will be recognized as the associate prosecutor. Minnesota and New
Jersey statutes authorize any private citizen to hire an attorney to assist the public prose-
cutor in enforcing election laws. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211.33 (West 1947) ; N.J. STAT.
ANN:. § 19:34-63 (1940). AV. VA. CODE ANN. §404 (1955) implies that a private citizen
has a right to hire an assistant prosecutor.
56. Cases listed in notes 50 supra, 57 infra contain no mention of any crime that a pri-
vate attorney cannot assist in prosecuting.
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private assistant prosecutors even in actions for such serious crimes as murder,
manslaughter, burglary, larceny and rape.Y7
Through his role as assistant prosecutor, the private attorney frequently
controls the criminal action. Many states permit privately hired counsel to
conduct criminal prosecutions alone with the permission of the public prose-
cutor and the trial court.5 8 While most jurisdictions require that the public
prosecutor be present to supervise, no limitation has been imposed on the scope
or extent of the private prosecutor's activities. 59 In response to the question-
naire, many prosecutors stated that they permit private attorneys to control
criminal prosecutions. 60 Unless the privately hired attorney violates the defen-
57. State v. Wilson, 24 Kan. 189 (1880) (murder) ; Bennyfield v. Commonwealth,
13 Ky. L. Rep. 446, 17 S.W. 271 (1891) (dictum) (manslaughter) ; State v. Bartlett, 55
Me. 200 (1867) (larceny) ; State v. Tough, 12 N.D. 425, 96 N.W. 1025 (1903) (burglary) ;
State v. Lohm, 97 W. Va., 652, 125 S.E. 758 (1924) (rape). Private attorneys have also
assisted in prosecuting many other crimes. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 107, 30 S.E.
452 (1898) (felonious wounding) ; State v. Ward, 61 Vt. 153, 17 Atl. 483 (1888) (arson) ;
Perry v. State, 84 Okla. Crim. 211, 181 P.2d 280 (1924) (adultery) ; Commonwealth v.
Derr, 39 Pa. County Ct. 125 (Berks 1947) (fornication) ; State v. Hoshor, 26 Wash. 643,
67 Pac. 386 (1901) (embezzlement) ; Williams v. State, 188 Ind. 283, 123 N.E. 209 (1919)
(bribery) ; People v. Calkins, 8 Cal. App. 2d 251, 47 P.2d 544 (1935) (criminal libel) ;
LaShar v. People, 74 Colo. 503, 223 Pac. 59 (1924) (obtaining money under false pre-
tenses) ; Bergstrasser v. People, 134 Ill. App. 609 (1907) (gambling) ; State v. O'Brien,
35 Mont. 482, 90 Pac. 514 (1907) (illegal liquor sales).
58. People v. Powell, 87 Cal. 348, 25 Pac. 481 (1891) ; State v. Bartlett, 105 Me. 212,
74 AtI. 18 (1909) ; State v. Rue, 72 Minn. 296, 75 N.W. 235 (1898) ; State v. Ward, 61 Vt.
153, 17 Atl. 483 (1888). In Jackson v. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 107, 30 S.E. 326 (1898), and
State v. Stafford, 89 W. Va. 301, 109 S.E. 326 (1921), private attorneys gained sole control
of the prosecution after starting as the public official's assistant.
There is some indication that private prosecution has become quite common in some
areas without attracting widespread attention. In approving a privately conducted prose-
cution for fornication, the court of Berks County, Pennsylvania said it was a common
practice for such actions to be privately prosecuted. Commonwealth v. Derr, supra note
57. In Lanni v. Bayonne, 7 N.J. Super. 169, 72 A.2d 397 (App. Ct. 1950), the propriety
of private criminal prosecution to enforce a municipal zoning ordinance was uncontested.
59. Oglesby v. State, 83 Fla. 132, 90 So. 825 (1922); Hayner v. People, 213 Ill. 142,
72 N.E. 792 (1904) ; State v. Wilson, 24 Kan. 189 (1880); Perry v. State, 84 Okla. Crim.
211, 181 P.2d 280 (1947) ; State v. Kent, 4 N.D. 577, 62 N.W. 631 (1895) ; Burkhard v.
State, 18 Tex. App. 599 (1855). Aside from the requirement that a member of the public
prosecutor's staff be present at the trial, no limitations were imposed on private prosecutors
in cases cited in notes 50, 57 supra.
The Louisiana Supreme Court held that if the district attorney is present, he can en-
trust the conduct of the trial exclusively to the private prosecutor. State v. Petrich, 122
La. 127, 47 So. 438 (1908). Other courts have approved unlimited activity for private
prosecutors as long as the public official is in charge. Thalheim v. State, 38 Fla. 169, 20
So. 938 (1896) ; Jackson v. State, 156 Ga. 842, 120 S.E. 535 (1923) ; State v. Matthews,
341 Mo. 1121, 111 S.W.2d 62 (1937).
60. QUESTIONNAIE. See note 8 supra. Sixty per cent of the responding prosecutors
stated that they permit privately hired attorneys to aid in the presentation of the case at
trial with no restriction on the scope of his activity. The private prosecutor is permitted
to control the criminal action of 16% of the responding public officials with the sole limita-
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dant's right to a fair trial by using unfair tactics, appellate courts will not ordi-
narily reverse a successful private prosecution.0 ' However, some courts will
reverse a conviction if the relationship between the accused and private pros-
ecutor or hiring citizen might have produced unfairness.
62
Private prosecution is especially common before magistrates, municipal courts
and justices of the peace. 63 Questionnaire responses disclosed that in at least
twenty-eight states, it is a common practice for private attorneys to prosecute
criminal actions in the lesser courts.64 Since these courts customarily have
jurisdiction over all misdemeanors,0 5 private citizens may initiate criminal ac-
tions which result in jail terms up to one year. In many states the latitude of
private prosecutors is extended by the fact that the public prosecutor need not
attend such courts unless the presiding official requests his appearance.0 6 If
the district attorney chooses, he can control the proceedings in these courts ;67
in his absence, a private attorney is in complete charge of the prosecution. 3
tion that a mcmber of the prosecutol-'s staff be present at the trial. Three per cent of the
public prosecutors would give private attorneys complete control of the criminal action.
61. Davis v. People, 77 Colo. 546, 238 Pac. 25 (1925) ; Hayner v. People, 213 Ill. 142,
72 N.E. 792 (1904) (dictum) ; Commonwealth v. Musto, 348 Pa. 300, 35 A.2d 72 (1944).
62. State v. Halstead, 73 Iowa 376, 35 N.W. 457 (1887) (after ceasing to represent
the defendant, an attorney cannot join the prosecution) ; State v. Scott, 72 Idaho 202, 239
P.2d 258 (1951) (private prosecutor cannot be interested in a civil case involving the same
set of facts) ; Flege v. State, 93 Neb. 610, 142 NAV. 276 (1913) (reversible error for a
party once a suspect of committing the crime in question to hire an assistant prosecutor) ;
Compton v. Commonwealth, 163 Va. 999, 175 S.E. 879 (1934) (public officials connected
with trial administration cannot employ a private attorney to assist in the prosecution).
See also State v. Lohm, 97 W. Va. 652, 125 S.E. 758 (1924) (private prosecutor must re-
veal the identity of his employer). Contra, State v. Carden, 209 N.C. 404, 183 S.E. 898
(1936). Appearance of the private prosecutor before the grand jury, and a great disparity
in number and experience between prosecution and defense counsel, have also led to reversal
of a conviction. Cobletz v. State, 164 Md. 558, 166 AtI. 45 (1933) ; People v. Blevins, 251
Ill. 381, 96 N.E. 214 (1911).
Employment of the private prosecutor on a contingent fee is another possible motiva-
tion for unfairness. State v. Hoshor, 26 Wash. 643, 67 Pac. 386 (1901), affirmed an em-
bezzlement conviction when the private prosecutor was hired on a contingent fee; however,
a private prosecutor's employment contract based on a contingent fee will not be enforced.
Price v. Caperton, 62 Ky. (1 Duv.) 207 (1864) ; Baca v. Padilla, 26 N.M. 223, 190 Pac.
730 (1920).
63. These courts act in a dual capacity as committing magistrates in felony cases and
as trial courts for misdemeanors. Miller, Compromise of Criminal Cases, 1 So. CALIF. L.
Rxv. 1, 8 (1927).
64. QUESTIONNAME. See note Ssupra.
65. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 37.01(2) (1943) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 1-1406 (1948);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-54 (1953).
66. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 31-2604(2) (1948); KAN. GEN. STAT. § 19-703
(1949) ; OKaA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 184 (1937).
67. State v. Court, 123 Kan. 774, 256 Pac. 804 (1927) ; State ex rel. Muller v. Judge,
106 La. 437, 31 So. 50 (1901) ; OmE. Rav. STAT. § 156.520 (1953).
68. QUESTIONNAIRE. See note 8 supra. Responses by district attorneys listed a wide
range of offenses commonly prosecuted. The public officials suggested no limitation on the
offenses private parties could prosecute in the lesser courts.
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Some states fortify private prosecution in these courts by statutes which pro-
hibit exclusion by a public prosecutor of assisting private attorneys. 69
Somewhat different, related forms of private prosecution which are exten-
sively used are qui tarn actions and multiple damage suits. 70 Twenty-one states
and the federal government have qui tain statutes which provide that private
citizens can receive part of the fine for successfully prosecuting a wide variety
of crimes such as violations of tax, gambling, narcotics and liquor control laws.71
Frequently referred to as a type of qui tarn action, multiple damage suits are a
hybrid action combining the remedial element of a civil suit with the penal
aspect of a criminal prosecution.72 Multiple damage actions differ from tradi-
Allowing private citizens to prosecute minor offenses is sometimes justified as a means
to keep the public prosecutor free for more important matters. This rationale led Wiscon-
sin to relieve the district attorney of the duty to prosecute certain minor offenses. Wis.
STAT. § 59.44 (1953). See note 3 supra. While originally conceived as a means of allowing
private parties to act on minor offenses, this provision was used for the prosecution of a
very serious case of assault and battery in Bartell v. State, 106 Wis. 342, 82 N.W. 142
(1900). The Wisconsin legislature refused to limit this statute in 1951, and recommenda-
tions have since been made that it be broadened to allow private citizens to take over the
district attorney's duties on other minor crimes. Note, 1953 Wis. L. REv. 170. For an
account of private prosecution by Connecticut grand jurors, see Pickett, The Office of the
Public Prosecutor in Connecticut, 17 J. Cam. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 348, 351 (1927).
69. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. § 203; and ORE. REv. STAT. § 133.760 (1953) give the private
complainant the right to hire counsel and be present at all proceedings before the magis-
trate. See People ex rel. Pringle v. Conway, 121 Misc. 620, 202 N.Y. Supp. 104 (Sup. Ct.
1923). People ex rel. Howes v. Grady, 66 Hun. 465, 21 N.Y. Supp. 381 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1892), aff'd, 144 N.Y. 685, 39 N.E. 858 (1895), held that in the absence of the district at-
torney and his assistants, private counsel may appear and conduct the prosecution alone in
the magistrate's courts.
70. Qui tain or informer actions originated in the middle ages and were extensively
used in Tudor England. The primitive state gave private citizens a personal pecuniary
interest in order to extend the long arm of criminal law enforcement. 4 HOLDSWORwr, A
HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 355 (1924). See text at note 96 infra for discussion of
the development of multiple damage actions.
71. See, e.g., 12 STAT. 698 (1863), as amended, 31 U.S.C. §§231-32 (1952) (fraud in
government contracts) ; 38 STAT. 277 (1914), 21 U.S.C. § 183 (1952) (narcotics violations) ;
18 U.S.C. § 3113 (1952) (transporting liquor into Indian territory) ; GA. ComE ANN. § 92-
2103 (1937) (tax frauds) ; Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 372.040 (Baldwin 1955) (gambling) ;
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 25-2109 (1948) (stallions and mules running loose) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 3222 (Purdon 1945) (shooting pigeons in Philadelphia). For the application of qui taw
statutes, see State v. Fillyan, 3 Ala. 735 (1842) (action to collect part of the penalty for
illegal billiard table operation) ; Payne v. Coursey, 20 Ga. 585 (1856) (tax evasion) ; In-
dianapolis & St. L. Ry. v. People, 91 Ill. 452 (1879) (failure to bring trains to a stop at
intersecting railroad lines) ; Yocum v. Daniel, 24 Ky. 14 (1829) (action to collect part
of the penalty for dueling); Martin v. M'Night, 1 Tenn. 330 (1808) (peddling without a
license). Most jurisdictions hold that the informer can initiate the prosecution without
waiting for action by the public prosecutor. Adams v. Wood, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336
(1805) ; Canfield v. Mitchell, 43 Conn. 169 (1875) ; State ex rel. Kemp v. Hannibal & St.
J. Ry., 30 Mo. App. 494 (1888). Contra, Smith v. Looks, 108 Mass. 139 (1871).
72. Historically qui tarn actions involved a suit for the state as well as for the private
prosecutor. 4 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 70, at 355. More recently, actions have been
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tional qui tain suits in that the entire recovery is retained by the prosecutor.
Vhile qui tain type laws were designed for use before the advent of modern
law enforcement techniques, they are still applied. As recently as 1943 the
United States Supreme Court affirmed a judgment giving a private citizen one-
half of a $315,000 fine imposed in a prosecution which he had conducted under
a federal qui tamn statute.7"
Persuasive foreign precedents offer support for private prosecution. In Eng-
land private prosecution is the basic system of criminal law enforcement.
7 4
Private citizens and policemen acting as private citizens initiate the vast ma-
jority of all prosecutions. 75 A state agency, the Office of the Director of Public
Prosecutions, conducts the remaining actions, most of which are the more
serious offenses. 76 While most criminal actions are conducted by the public
labeled "qui tam" and "penal" even though the private prosecutor keeps the entire multi-
ple damage judgment. Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212 (1905) ; Lambur v. Yates, 148 F.2d
1.37 (8th Cir. 1945) ; Jacob v. Clark, 115 Ky. 255, 72 S.W. 1095 (1903). Multiple damage
suits are characteristically labeled "civil" suits. E.g., Bluefields S.S. Co. v. United Fruit
Co., 243 Fed. 1 (3d Cir. 1917).
Constitutions and many statutes-statutes of limitations, for example-require classify-
ing these statutes as "civil" or "penal." The inadequacy of this traditional dichotomy is
dramatized by the fact that the same law has been classified as penal by the Kentucky
Court of Appeals and as remedial by the United States District Court for Kentucky. Jacob
v. Clark, supra; Salonen v. Farley, 82 F. Supp. 25 (E.D. Ky. 1949). The statute involved
in these cases was Ky. Rrv. STAT. ANN. § 372.040 (Baldwin 1955), which provides that
anyone may recover from a gambler treble the amount of his gambling winnings. For dis-
cussion of the difficulty in categorizing these statutes as either civil or penal, see Wilson,
Origin and Limited Life of the Anti-trust Cause of Action, 21 KAN. CITY L. REv. 127
(1953).
73. United States e.r rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943), applying the Act of
March 2, 1863, c. 67, § 6, 12 STAT. 698. Congress has since amended this statute to provide
that notice of such suits must first be given to the United States attorney, and that a pri-
vate party may then bring the action only if the government fails to act within sixty days
after being notified or fails to prosecute diligently for six months after commencing the
action. Even if a private citizen conducts a successful prosecution, he will be awarded only
what the trial court considers appropriate, not to exceed one-fourth of the total fine. 57
STAT. 608 (1943), 31 U.S.C. §§ 231-32 (1952). For relatively recent qui taw actions, see
People ex rel. Wegner v. Columbia Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 87 Ill. App. 37 (1914) ; cases cited
in note 72 supra.
As law enforcement methods have become more efficient, qui tam actions have been dis-
couraged. Maryland has repealed all its qui tain statutes. MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS
art. 38, § 3 (1951). The Michigan Supreme Court has long considered qui tarn prosecu-
tions as disfavored actions. Meister v. People, 31 Mich. 99 (1875). Even some advocates
of qui tarn legislation defend it only as a means of setting one rogue to catch another. See
remarks of Senator Howard quoted in United States ex rel. Bayarsky v. Brooks, 154 F.2d
344, 345-46 (3d Cir. 1946).
74. JAcKSON, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 108-10 (1953);
Atkinson, The Department of the Director of Public Prosecutionr, 22 CAN. B. REv. 413
(1944) ; MATHEW, THE OFFICE AND DUTIS OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
4 (1950).
75. Id. at 4; JACKSON, op. cit. supra note 74, at 108-10.
76. Id. at 108; Atkinson, supra note 74, at 415.
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prosecutor in Scotland, private prosecution may be authorized by the court if
the public official fails to act.7 7 France and Austria have also used private
prosecution to restrain the discretion of the public prosecutor. 78 Citizens may
privately prosecute minor crimes in France.70  Spain and Pakistan permit
private prosecution of certain crimes.80 In Germany private citizens may pros-
ecute many crimes including libel, slander, assault with a deadly weapon, van-
dalism and unfair competition.8 1 In China, settlement of criminal disputes has
traditionally been left primarily in private hands.8 2 Although reform move-
ments and extensive code revisions have occurred in some of these countries,
private prosecution laws have emerged intact and have, indeed, drawn no
significant criticism.
8 3
Private Rights to Enforce the Criminal Law
Every citizen has, in a sense, a right to the efficient performance of all gov-
ernmental functions, but only in the field of criminal law enforcement does
this right entitle him personally to assume a task which has been performed
inadequately.84 The primary policy justification for this unique exception is
that it promotes society's interest in better and more efficient lav enforce-
77. Private criminal action is commonly conducted in Scotland with the approval of
the public prosecutor; however, if the public official refuses to proceed or allow private
action, the High Court of Justiciary may authorize justifiable criminal prosecutions. J. &
P. Coates Ltd. v. Brown, [1909] Sess. Cas. 29 (Scot. Justiciary Ct.) ; Normand, The
Public Prosecutor It Scotland, 54 L.Q. Rav. 345, 347-48 (1938).
78. France uses private prosecution to make up for neglect, inertia or possible cor-
ruption inherent in public prosecution. Wright, French Criminal Procedure, 44 L.Q. Ray-V.
324, 329-30 (1928). Austria has permitted the injured party to replace the public prose-
cutor with a private attorney in case of abandonment of the action by the public official.
ESMEIN, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 597 (1913).
79. DONNEDIEU DR VABRns, TRAIr PLEMENTAIRE DE DRorr CRIMINEL 635 (1944).
80. For information on private prosecution in Spain, see ESmEIN, op. Cit. supra note
78, at 596-97. In a lecture at the Yale Law School on December 2, 1954, Zafrulla Kahn,
formerly Foreign Minister of Pakistan, stated that noncognizable or minor crimes are
privately prosecuted in Pakistan.
81. Arts. 376-77 STRAFPROZEBORnNUNG (1943).
82. HSIEN CHIN Hu, COMMON DESCENT GROUP IN CHINA AND ITS FuNCTIoNs 53-
54 (1948).
83. English criminal procedure has been substantially revised in recent years; how-
ever, private prosecution has been retained and praised. The Director of Public Prose-
cutions is among those urging that private citizens should keep their broad power to con-
duct criminal actions. MATHEw, op. cit. supra note 74, at 12-16. In 1953 the German
Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure were substantially revised, but private
prosecution- was retained. Drittes Strafrechtsdindcrungsgeseta of Aug. 6, 1953, [1953]
BUxNDESGEsrzBLATr pt. 1, at 743 (German Federal Republic). On French private prose-
cution see Jacobson in Revue Politique et Parlementaire, Oct. 10, 1922.
84. The people do not abdicate their right to competent law enforcement by selecting
a public prosecutor. See Taylor v. State, 49 Fla. 69, 38 So. 380 (1905) ; Tull v. State, 99
Ind. 238 (1884) ; Territory v. Harding, 6 Mont. 323, 12 Pac. 750 (1887).
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ment.85 The magnitude of the task of law enforcement has necessitated the
assistance of private citizens from Elizabethan days, when the informer was
first utilized, to the present, when the citizen witnessing a crime has the power
to arrest.8 6 The private citizen's peculiar knowledge of the facts plus his in-
terest in diligent prosecution have further commended him as a proper person
to aid in law enforcement.
While allowance of private participation is usually explained solely in terms
of the value to society of the increased law enforcement thereby obtained,
8 7
an examination of the history and practice of criminal law demonstrates that
a policy of encouraging vindication of purely personal grievances has played a
significant part. The early common law permitted the injured party to prose-
cute criminally as a substitute for private vengeance.88 And private prosecu-
tion, retained by England today, has been characterized as a procedure for the
vindication of private as well as public rights.89 In the United States a promi-
nent example of the policy of encouraging vindication of personal grievances
through the criminal law is found in the recognition given the private assistant
prosecutor. Since he often appears in situations where the adequacy of public
prosecution has not been questioned, his presence can be attributed only to a
recognition by the law that the individual should be allowed to seek personal
satisfaction. 0 Where assistant private prosecutors are authorized by statute,
there is further recognition of a purely personal interest in enforcement. 91 By
85. See, e.g., Thalheim v. State, 38 Fla. 169, 20 So. 938 (1896) ; Bennyfield v. Com-
monwealth, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 446, 17 S.W. 271 (1891) ; State v. Kent, 4 N.D. 577, 62 N.W.
631 (1895).
86. See note 70 supra; Vaccaro v. Collier, 38 F.2d 862 (D. Md. 1930).
87. According to classical doctrine, criminal law remedies only offenses against society,
and civil recovery is the measure of the individual's rights. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES
OF CRIMINAL LAW 191-96 (1947) ; MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW 20-22 (1934) ; PROSSER, TORTS
7-8 (2d ed. 1955).
88. MOLEY, POLITICS AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 193 (1929). See also Wright,
supra note 78, at 329.
89. 1 STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW IN ENGLAND 496 (1883). See also
MATHEW, op. cit. supra note 74, at 4.
90. See Oglesby v. State, 83 Fla. 132, 90 So. 825 (1922) ; State v. O'Brien, 35 Mont.
482, 90 Pac. 514 (1907) ; State v. Lohm, 97 W. Va. 652, 125 S.E. 758 (1924) (dictum).
91. I.AN. GEN. STAT. § 19-717 (1949) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211.33 (West 1947) ; and
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:34-63 (1940) provide that private citizens may hire assistant prose-
cutors. In addition KAN. GEN. STAT. §§ 19-718, 19-719 (1949) provides that an assistant
prosecuting attorney may be appointed at the county's expense upon a petition by the prose-
cuting witness in counties of less than 10,000 people.
Further recognition of private rights to enforce the criminal law is indicated by several
adultery statutes which provide that only the injured spouse may initiate adultery prose-
cutions. Aniz. CODE ANN. § 43-401 (1939) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 702.1 (1950) ; MIcH. STAT.
ANN. § 28.220 (1933) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.15 (West 1947) ; N.D. Rav. CODE § 12-
2210 (1943) ; WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.79.110 (1951). OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 871
(1937) allows any citizen to register a criminal complaint if adultery is "open and notorious."
Short of that, only the wronged spouse can start an adultery prosecution. Michigan and
Oklahoma, on adultery which is not "open and notorious," strengthen private control by
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permitting the private assistant to challenge the district attorney's decision to
dismiss a prosecution, some of these statutes give a private citizen a right to
plead for vindication of his personal interest in conviction after the public prose-
cutor has determined that society's interests require no further action. Three
states allow the private attorney to force a full hearing of the district attorney's
decision to dismiss, with final determination reserved for the courtY2  An
analogous statutory provision specifies that no accused party may be discharged
without notice to all interested parties and an opportunity to contest his re-
lease
. 3
Multiple and punitive damage actions are further evidence of approval by
the law of personal satisfaction through enforcement of criminal-type sanctions.
Multiple damage actions originated in Roman law, where the culprit was re-
quired to pay the victim double or treble damages for criminal acts. 5 In fif-
teenth century England, when there was no clear distinction between civil and
criminal offenses, an action of debt for two or three times the damage suffered
was a common remedy for wrongs now considered criminal.95 Multiple damage
actions for offenses within the periphery of the criminal law have endured to
the present. 96 And in contemporary damage law, there is often a correlation
between the amount recovered and the antisocial nature of the act.9 7 Thus, in
requiring that the prosecution be discontinued at the request of the initiating spouse. People
v. Dalrymple, 55 Mich. 519, 22 N.W. 20 (1885) ; Taylor v. State, 29 Okla. Crim. 160, 232
Pac. 963 (1925). While these unique adultery laws may be explained as devices to keep the
home intact if the wronged spouse is willing to condone the act, there are substantial in-
dications that these statutes are a recognition of private rights. Reversing an adultery
conviction, the court in State v. La Bounty, 64 Wash. 415, 116 Pac. 1073 (1911), said that
adultery was a crime against husband or wife personally, rather than an offense against
society. Adultery is referred to as a "private wrong" in Lee v. State, 28 Okla. Crim. 397,
402,231 Pac. 324 (1924).
92. KAN. GEN. STAT. § 19-717 (1949) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211.33 (West 1947) ; N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 19:34-63 (1940).
93. ORE. REV. STAT. § 34.650 (1953). The Cleveland Foundation Survey made an
analogous recommendation that no nolle prosequi should be granted until ample oppor-
tunity was given for complaining witnesses and police officers to contest that action. CLr--
LAND FOUNDATION SURVEY, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND 328 (1922).
94. 1. STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 89, at 9-10.
95. 2 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 453 (1924).
96. Section 4 of the Clayton Act gives treble damages to anyone injured as a result of
violation of the antitrust laws. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1952).
Federal price control regulations give injured parties an action for treble damages. 64 STAT.
811 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 2109(c) (1952). Violation of federal overtime wage rates entitles
the injured employee to double damages. 52 STAT. 1069 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b) (1952).
The vague line separating civil and criminal actions is demonstrated in the multiple
damages area. See note 72 supra.
97. The courts have held that punitive damages are penal in nature and are imposed
when an unlawful act is committed with criminal indifference or malice. E.g., Philadelphia,
W. & B. Ry. v. Quigley, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 208 (1858); Cashin v. Northern Pac. Ry.,
96 Mont. 92, 28 P.2d 862 (1934) ; Voltz v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 332 Pa. 141,
2 A.2d 697 (1938). Like criminal sanctions, punitive damages are imposed to punish thc
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tort law the same injury may entitle the harmed party to nothing if caused
without fault, to single damages if produced negligently, or to punitive damages
if intentionally inflicted.98 Since civil satisfaction requires only that the injured
party be made whole, recovery in excess of compensatory damages indicates
punishment for a criminal-type act. 9 Neither promotion of law enforcement
nor deterrence explains the existence of multiple or punitive damages in all
cases. For example, punitive tort damages are allowed in situations where
compensation amply stimulates litigation to enforce society's norms. 10 And
the objective of deterrence is furthered only by the imposition of extra damages;
it is not advanced by the fact that the injured party receives them rather than
the state. Thus, the right of the injured individual rather than society to bring
the suit and receive the excess over compensation indicates that he has a per-
sonal right to extract a punishment from the wrongdoer.
A system of private prosecution can be justified in terms of both society's
interest in increased law enforcement and the individual's interest in vindication
of personal grievances. Full participation by the citizen as a private prosecutor
is needed to cope with the serious threat to society posed by the district attor-
ney's improper action and inaction. This rationale alone is adequate to support
private prosecution. To the extent that this plan affords an opportunity to satisfy
personal grievances, it further commends itself as a recognition of very real and
defensible human motives. Holmes suggested that vengeance is a justifiable
objective of the criminal law. 10 1 He quotes with approval Stephen's statement
that "the criminal law stands to the passion of revenge in much the same re-
lation as marriage to the sexual appetite."'01 2 A leader in ethical jurisprudence,
wrongdoer and as a deterrent to others in society's interest. E.g., Eshelman v. Rawalt, 298
Ill. 192, 131 N.E. 675 (1921) ; Martin v. Cambas, 134 Ore. 257, 293 Pac. 601 (1930) ; Foster
v. Bourgeois, 253 S.W. 880 (Tex. Civ. App. 1.923). The analogy between crimes and torts
which warrant punitive damages is further supported by the requirement of evil or mali-
cious intent in both. E.g., Fidelity Appraisal Co. v. Federal Appraisal Co., 217 Cal. 307,
18 P.2d 950 (1933) ; Martin v. Cambas, 134 Ore. 257, 293 Pac. 601 (1930) ; Step v. Black,
14 Tenn. App. 153 (1931) (dictum). Criminal sanctions and punitive damages are so similar
that the Indiana Appellate Court refused to allow punitive damages where the defendant
would also be liable criminally because of his right not to be punished twice for the same
offense. Skufakiss v. Duray, 85 Ind. App. 426, 154 N.E. 289 (1926).
Commentators have agreed that punitive damage actions are penal in nature and reflect
treatment customarily afforded criminal acts. HALL, GENFRAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL
LAw 212-13 (1947) ; Willis, 11easure of Damages When Property Is Wrongfully Taken
by a Private Individual, 22 HARV. L. REv. 419, 420-21 (1909) ; Demogue, Validity of the
Theory of Compensatory Damages, 27 YALE L.J. 585, 592 (1918).
98. PROSSER, TORTS 5-6, 9-11, 165-66 (2d ed. 1955).
99. Willis. supra note 97, at 422.
100. Grinnel, Traffic Jam in the Courts, 39 MAss. L.Q. 6 (1954); Doyle, Traffic Jam
in the Courts from the Point of View of the Insurance Industry, 39 MASS. L.Q. 9 (1954);
Virtue, What Is the Log Jam Problem?, 15 F.R.D. 207, 214 (1954).
101. HOLMiES, THE CoMMON LAw 39-42 (1881.). See also HAIL, op. cit. supra note
97, at 202.
102. HOLMES, op. cit. supra note 101, at 39-42.
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Morris Cohen commented that the law should provide avenues of satisfaction
for vengeance and retribution, which are deeply grounded in human nature.'10
Cohen said that it was "sentimental foolishness" to disregard the prevalent
retribution motive which prevails in relations between men and nations. 10 4 Both
Holmes and Cohen stressed the importance of accommodating such desires with-
in the law rather than forcing them to be satisfied outside it.i °5 Moreover, a
degree of privity of interest exists between the harmed party and the exacting
of justice. The injured individual was most severely harmed by the criminal
act; he will be uniquely affected by the failure of society to prosecute.'0 0 Fur-
thermore, the injured individual's grievances cannot be satisfied by civil reme-
dies if the district attorney refuses to prosecute his malefactor. Crimes against
the person cannot be adequately measured or remedied by monetary damages.
1 7
In addition, the criminal is almost always judgment-proof. 0i Thus, if the public
prosecutor refuses to act, the injured individual is likely to have no recourse
against his malefactor unless he is allowed to invoke criminal sanctions in his
own right.
Allowing satisfaction of private grievances through private participation in
the criminal law is not, of course, unqualifiedly beneficial. For such a policy
is subject a fortiori to the principal criticism currently made of the public
prosecutor's adversary role in criminal law: that private rights are often lost
and the truth obscured in an overzealous struggle for conviction. And indeed.
it seems likely that the unfriendly attitude of the courts toward private prose-
cution is traceable in some measure to a distaste for the introduction of an
element of private vengeance into criminal law administration.'0 0 However,
as has been seen, release of private vengeance through the criminal law is a
historic policy which retains some validity today. And experience has demon-
strated that the private prosecutor plays as fairly as his public counterpart.""
103. Cohen, Moral Principles of the Criminal Law, 49 YALE L.J. 987, 1010-12 (1940).
104. Id. at 1011.
105. HoLuEs, op. cit. supra note 101, at 41-42; Cohen, supra note 103, at 1011-12.
106. See Baker & De Long, The Prosecuting Attorney: The Process of Prosecution,
26 J. Cixm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 185, 197 (1935).
107. HOLMEs, op. cit. supra note 101, at 40.
108. Inability to pay damages may, in itself, justify the imposition of criminal sanc-
tions. For example, when MacAuley drafted the India Penal Code, he made breach of con-
tract for carrying passengers a crime. Since Palanquin bearers were too poor to pay
damages and women and children had to be carried out of desolate tracts, a criminal sanc-
tion was the only means available to induce the bearers to fulfill their contracts. HOLmES,
op. cit. su pra note 101, at 40-41.
109. See Oglesby v. State, 83 Fla. 132, 90 So. 825 (1922) ; Meister v. People, 31 Mich.
99 (1875) ; Biemel v. State, 71 Wis. 444, 37 N.W. 244 (1888).
110. Cases cited in notes 50, 57 supra indicate that the private prosecutor's behavior
is seldom criticized. A possible explanation for the dearth of objections to the private
prosecutor's tactics is that he is held only to the standards of the public prosecutor. The
public prosecutor is recognized as an advocate. Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364 (2d
Cir. 1925) ; Ex parte Hayter, 16 Cal. App. 211, 116 Pac. 370 (1911) ; Keyes v. State, 122
Ind. 527, 23 N.E. 1097 (1890). Moreover, the public prosecutor has been known to use un-
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Certainly, vengeance is not necessarily a more corrupting motive than political
ambition. Furthermore, judicial controls are available to minimize abuses where
danger exists, and would undoubtedly be more carefully exercised in private
than in public prosecutions."' It seems likely, in sum, that the few abuses which
might evade controls, in a system of private prosecution of limited scope, would
constitute far less of an evil than the threat to society currently posed by the
district attorney's stranglehold on prosecuting machinery.
A PRACTICAL PLAN
An alliance of private advocacy with the judicial replacement power would
minimize deficiencies in criminal law enforcement. A system of private prose-
cution, under which the court could substitute a petitioning citizen's counsel for
an errant public prosecutor, can be both effective and practicable. And this
system can be constructed so that neither the rights of the accused, nor the
primary responsibility of the public prosecutor for conducting criminal prose-
cutions, will be impaired.
Effectiveness of Private Prosecutor and Trial Judge
The private attorney will remedy the failure of the district attorney more
effectively than a substitute public official. Opportunity for private prosecu-
tion will provide aggrieved individuals with incentive to challenge the prose-
cutor's conduct. Having witnessed the abuse of discretion by one public official,
the person concerned about violations of law might be reluctant to take action
which would result only in substitution of one official for another. Where the
refusal of the first prosecutor to act was motivated by economic or political
pressure, the private citizen's preference for private action would seem espe-
cially justified. 1 12 And if private citizens are given incentive to convince a court
that the prosecutor's discretion has been abused, the courts will thereby acquire
the information necessary for effective use of the judicial replacement power.113
Moreover, criminal prosecution would benefit from the continuity provided
by having the private complainant follow up his objections to the public prose-
cutor's conduct by prosecuting the criminal action himself. The case against the
defendant must be organized with some care for the purpose of demonstrating
that the district attorney has abused his discretion. Duplication of effort will
fair tactics. People v. Creasy, 236 N.Y. 205, 140 N.E. 563 (1923) (use of false testimony) ;
Venable v. State, 84 Tex. Crim. 354, 207 S.W. 520 (1918) (use of threats and coercion) ;
State v. Russell, 83 Wis. 330, 53 N.W. 441 (1892) (ruse to get testimony). For additional
unfair tactics used by public prosecutors, see Notes, 24 MIcH. L. Rv. 834 (1926), 4 B.U.L.
Rrv. 139 (1924).
111. The courts insist that the trial court can insure that the defendant receives a fair
trial despite the participation of private prosecutors. Hayner v. People, 213 Ill. 142, 72
N.E. 792 (1904) (dictum) ; State v. Wilson, 24 Kan. 189 (1880) ; State v. Bartlett, 55 Me.
200 (1867).
112. See notes 7, 16,20 supra.
113. See note 28supra.
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thus be avoided by allowing the private attorney then to act as the prosecutor
rather than to bring in a substitute public official. Finally, the private prose-
cutor would be likely to conduct a vigorous prosecution.
114
There is considerable evidence that private citizens are ready to take the
initiative if given a method of combating laxity in law enforcement. The
Kefauver Committee reported several situations where private citizens were
interested in initiating indictments but were stymied by the district attorney's
refusal to prosecute.115 Furthermore, the extensive participation of privately
hired assistant prosecutors in the United States, and private prosecutors in
England, demonstrates the willingness of the citizen to take action if permitted
to do so. 1 1 6
The trial court can effectively fill this role of exercising the discretion neces-
sary to prevent undesirable prosecutions. Decisions involving competing de-
mands for leniency, deterrence and protection of society's interests are not
novel for judges.117 The court is even better qualified than the public prose-
cutor to evaluate the availability of time on the court calendar. The adequacy
of judicial discretion as a basis for initiating private prosecutions is demon-
strated by the satisfactory operation of private prosecution in England.118 This
experience further attests to the sufficiency of court approval as a safeguard
against unfounded and malicious actions." 9
114. Some have supported private prosecution on the ground that it would insure a
vigorous presentation of the state's case. Keyes v. State, 122 Ind. 527, 23 N.E. 1097 (1890) ;
People v. Tidwell, 4 Utah 506, 12 Pac. 61 (1886) ; Note, 5 Wis. L. REv. 97 (1929). For
authorities taking a contrary view of the desirability of a partisan approach in criminal
law administration, see note 109 supra.
115. Private citizens of Miami and Hollywood, Florida, Covington, Kentucky, Har-
rison County, Mississippi, and the New Orleans area made extensive and futile efforts to
initiate criminal prosecutions. Kefauver Committee Interim Report 10; Kefauver Commit-
tee Third Interim Report 83-84; Kefauver Committee Final Report 43-44, 73, 75.
Although the Kefauver Committee did not recommend private prosecution, its reports
repeatedly emphasized the need for action by private citizens to combat widespread crime.
Kefauver Committee Third Interim Report 30; Kefauver Cdmnittee Final Report 2, 6, 12.
116. The frequency of use of private assistant prosecutors is demonstrated by the large
ercentage of public prosecutors who stated, in response to the questionnaire, that they
have permitted privately hired attorneys to assist in criminal prosecutions. See note 52
supra. The high frequency of use of privately hired prosecutors in Oklahoma is indicated
by the large number of cases involving that issue which reach the appellate courts. Com-
ment, 12 OKLA. B.J. 1461 (1941). Statistics released in MATHEW, THE OFFICE AND DUTIES
OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS 4 (1950), demonstrate that a large number of
criminal prosecutions are undertaken by privately hired attorneys in England.
117. Chandler, Later-Day Procedures in the Sentencing and Treatment of Offenders
in the Federal Courts, 37 VA. L. REv. 825, 828-29 (1951); McGuire & Holtzoff, The
Problem of Sentence in the Criminal Law, 20 B.U.L. REv. 423, 424 (1940) ; Yankwich,
Changing Concepts of Crime and Punishment, 32 GEo. L.J. 1, 17 (1943) ; Note, 64 YALE
L.J. 260,265-66 (1954).
118. See text at notes 74-76 supra.
119. To prohibit unjustified private prosecutions England originally relied on the
grand jury, but ultimately abandoned this safeguard because juries in fact merely ratified
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Operation of the Plan
If the public prosecutor fails or refuses to prosecute, private prosecution
should be permitted only where the court in its discretion considers the criminal
action justified. The core of the plan is the limited substitution of judicial dis-
cretion for that of the public prosecutor. A summary hearing attended by all
interested parties desiring representation, including the district attorney, would
provide the court with necessary information. 120 The presumption supporting
the propriety of the district attorney's decisions would permit the court to grant
a petition only where circumstances so clearly warranted prosecution that rea-
sonable men would not differ.
With such a plan in effect, the public prosecutor would remain primarily
responsible for criminal prosecutions. The district attorney's acts would still
be accorded a presumption of propriety although not the virtually irrebuttable
one he now enjoys.' 21 He would be given notice and an opportunity to justify
his position to the court before any private petition could be granted. This
procedure would not lead to harassment of the district attorney, since the court
could always dismiss a groundless petition without notifying him, and would
probably do so in many cases. Replacement of the district attorney would be
in issue only if there were reason to believe he had abused his discretion by
refusing to act, attempting to postpone a matter indefinitely or proceeding
halfheartedly only to avoid a private prosecution.122 When the public prose-
cutor is called to contest a petition, his reasons for not acting should be given
great weight. The court should be reluctant to interfere with the good faith
action taken by examining judges. Lieck, Abolition of the Grand Jtry in England, 25 J.
Cam. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 623, 624-25 (1935) ; REPORT ON PRosEcuTION, op. Ct. supra note
8, at 34; see Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 59 (1906). The satisfactory operation of private
prosecution in England attests to the sufficiency of court approval as a safeguard against
unfounded and malicious actions. Lieck, supra, at 623.
120. Sufficient evidence may be adduced by affidavits to enable the trial court to deter-
mine whether a matter justifies criminal prosecution. The analogy to injunctions suggested
in note 121 infra is applicable. There, affidavits or verified statements provide the basis
for the court's decision. Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 279 U.S. 813 (1929) ; Benson Hotel
Corp. v. Woods, 168 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1948). Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co.,
206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953), provides the additional suggestion that limited oral testimony
might supplement affidavits to provide factual information necessary for the court's de-
cision.
121. The public prosecutor's decisions would be reversed only for error or abuse of
discretion. This test would be similar to that used by appellate courts in reviewing trial
court determinations on the issuance of temporary restraining injunctions. That formula
allows reversal on a showing of "clear proof that it [the lower court] has abused its dis-
cretion." Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., supra note 120, at 743 n.10; Love v.
Atchinson, T. & S.F. Ry., 185 Fed. 321, 331 (8th Cir. 1911) ; cf. Benson Hotel Corp. v.
Woods, supra note 120, at 696-97.
122. The Pennsylvania statute allows the trial court to replace the public prosecutor
for proceeding improperly as well as for neglect or refusal to act. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16,
§ 3432 (Purdon 1930). Such a provision is necessary in order to prevent the district attor-
ney from starting an action and conducting it haphazardly or delaying it in order to avoid
private intervention.
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planning of the public prosecutor. For once private prosecution is allowed,
the defenses of double jeopardy and res judicata would bar future state action.123
Finally, the district attorney should be able to intervene during a private prose-
cution to present evidence showing that the action should be dismissed.
Limitations on standing to prosecute would solve the objection that private
prosecution will allow vigilantes or meddlers to try to enforce all laws. Private
prosecution should be permitted only where the petitioning party has a cause
of action in tort on the same set of facts, or where the crime is "open and
notorious." This means that injury to a party could be redressed privately
whenever a court thinks prosecution is justified, but crimes which injure so-
ciety alone could be privately prosecuted only upon a showing that the crime
threatens public confidence in law and order, or undermines the integrity of
governmental institutions. Gambling and illegal liquor sales are the major
crimes generally linked with such dangers, but other crimes may create similar
problems. "Open and notorious" has been defined by the courts to mean mani-
fested continually by visible signs, generally believed to be true, and publicly
known.124 Crime has been called "open and notorious" when, for example,
numerous newspaper articles exposed gambling and illegal liquor sales; when
widespread solicitation by prostitutes occurred in public; and when 250 gamb-
ling machines were observed in 130 public places in one city.12 5
Other safeguards would restrain potential abuses in private prosecution. The
danger of unfounded criminal actions would be reduced by the common law
civil remedy for malicious prosecution. While most states grant the public
prosecutor immunity from malicious prosecution suits,'1 6 this protection is not
123. The private prosecutor acts in the name of the state. E.g., Taylor v. State, 49
Fla. 69, 38 So. 380 (1905) ; Commonwealth v. McHale, 97 Pa. 397 (1881) ; State v. Bart-
lett, 105 Me. 212, 74 At. 18 (1909). There is little doubt that the accused is put in jeopardy
when prosecuted privately, and a subsequent action by a public official would violate the
right to immunity from double jeopardy. See MILER, CR.IIwAL LAW 534-35 (1934). If
issues or facts necessary to a conviction have been decided against the state in a prior
action which has proceeded to final judgment, the doctrine of res judicata bars the second
action. United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916) ; Coffey v. United States, 116
U.S. 436 (1886) ; United States v. Meyerson, 24 F.2d 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1928).
124. Robinson v. United States, 33 F.2d 545 (W.D. La. 1929) ; People v. Salmon, 148
Cal. 303, 83 Pac. 42 (1905) ; Copeland v. State, 10 Okla. Crim. 1, 133 Pac. 258 (1913). The
California and Iowa Supreme Courts have agreed that open and notorious crime occurs
when there is a "demoralizing and debasing influence" on society. People v. Salmon, supra
at 305, 83 Pac. at 43; State v. Marvin, 12 Iowa 499, 505 (1861). A similar formula was
adopted in State v. Newnham, 17 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. App. 1929).
125. State ex inf. McKittrick v. Wymore, 345 Mo. 169, 132 S.W.2d 979 (1939). The
conditions found in State ex inf. McKittrick v. Graves, 346 Mo. 990, 144 S.W.2d 91. (1940),
were labeled open and notorious by the Missouri Supreme Court in State ex inf. McKit-
trick v. Wallach, 353 Mo. 312, 323, 182 S.W.2d 313, 319 (1944). The "open and notorious"
requirement has been found unsatisfied where public knowledge was limited and where the
illegal activity was temporary. People v. Salmon, supra note 124; State v. Newnham, supra
note 124; Copeland v. State, supra note 124.
126. See Note, 73 U. PA. L. R-,. 300 (1925). Most courts have deliberately chosen
to leave abused defendants without civil recourse rather than restrict the prosecutor's free-
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available to private prosecutors.127 Assessment of trial costs plus defense coun-
sel fees against the private prosecutor for actions instigated maliciously or with-
out probable cause would further discourage unfounded actions. Several states
currently impose this sanction by statute against malicious prosecuting wit-
nesses.128 Another provision of the plan would prohibit discontinuance with-
out the consent of the court under penalty of contempt. This would deter in-
itiation of prosecutions for such purposes as forcing profitable civil settlements
or collecting bills.
To establish a better balance between the discretion of the district attorney
and the rights of society and the injured individual to have the criminal pros-
ecuted, state legislatures should enact statutes providing substantially as fol-
lows:
1. A trial court may in its discretion, upon petition of any person, sub-
stitute an attorney hired by the petitioner to replace a public prose-
cutor for any criminal prosecution if
(a) the public prosecutor fails or refuses to prosecute the de-
fendant or proceeds improperly, and
(b) the crime charged is open and notorious or the petitioner
has a cause of action against the defendant in tort on the
facts alleged.
2. A trial court shall not grant a petition without notifying the public
prosecutor of the petition and allowing him reasonable time to answer
it.
3. A private prosecution shall not be discontinued without permission of
the trial court. At any stage of the proceedings the public prosecutor
may present evidence showing why the private prosecution should be
dismissed.
4. A private prosecutor shall receive reasonable compensation for legal
services from county funds unless the trial court determines that the
prosecution is malicious, in which case the petitioner shall pay the de-
fendant reasonable compensation for legal services plus trial costs.
29
dom. See, e.g., Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926) ; Griffith v. Slinkard, 146 Ind.
117, 44 N.E. 1001 (1896) ; Smith v. Parman, 101 Kan. 115, 165 Pac. 663 (1917) ; Watts
v. Gerking, 111 Ore. 641, 222 Pac. 318 (1924). Contra, Skeffington v. Eylward, 97 Minn.
244, 105 N.W. 638 (1906) ; Leong Yau v. Carden, 23 Hawaii 362 (1916).
127. Potter v. Gjersten, 37 Minn. 386, 34 N.W. 746 (1887); Puutio v. Roman, 76
Mont. 105, 245 Pac. 523 (1926) ; Beuthner v. Ellinger, 90 Wis. 439. 63 N.W. 756 (1895).
128. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38, § 717 (Smith-Hurd 1951); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 769.10,
772.2 (1950) ; and OrE. REv. STAT. § 156.290 (1953) provide thatcif the prosecuting witness
initiates a criminal action maliciously or without probable cause, the court may charge the
cost to that witness. VA. CODE § 19-233 (1950) ; and W. VA. CODE ANN. § 6167 (Supp. 1955)
authorize the court to give judgment against the prosecuting witness for the costs of the
accused if the prosecution was initiated maliciously or without probable cause.
129. This provision is not indispensable to an effective system of private prosecution.
The desirability of eliminating costs as an obstacle to well-founded private prosecutions
must be balanced against the possible detrimental effect of encouraging unfounded prose-
cutions which may arise because the state bears the cost. Since ample safeguards exist to
prevent unfounded prosecutions, it is desirable that the state should pay prosecution fees
so that legitimate criminal actions may be brought.
1955]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
CONCLUSION
Recent investigations have demonstrated that laxity in law enforcement
threatens governmental institutions and public confidence in the law. Private
prosecution can cover the areas of deficiency and still leave the bulk of the dis-
cretionary authority for criminal prosecutions with the district attorney. While
the proposed statute might appear to be too novel an innovation, it must be
remembered that all other attempts to restrain the district attorney's abuse of
discretion have failed. Furthermore, the novelty of the plan is only a measure
of the lack of knowledge Americans possess of the practical operation of such
a system in England. It is interesting to note that both the English and the
Americans have unfavorably evaluated the other's system of criminal law en-
forcement, suggesting strongly that the benefits of each may have been over-
looked.' 30 No doubt legislative approval of this statute will be slow to develop,
but some optimism can be taken from the fact that thirty-four per cent of the
public prosecutors responding to the questionnaire favored the proposed plan
for private prosecution.13 1 The need to develop community responsibility for
la&¢ enforcement is clear. With the courts as a fulcrum, private prosecution
would balance the excesses of the district attorney's discretion with individual
and community vigilance.
130. Private prosecution is opposed by United States courts on grounds that it would
lead to criminal actions for personal gratification, private gain or malice. E.g., Oglesby
v. State, 83 Fla. 132, 90 So. 825 (1922) (dictum) ; Meister v. People, 31 Mich. 99 (1875) ;
Biemel v. State, 71 Wis. 444, 37 N.W. 244 (1888). English objections to centralizing re-
sponsibility for criminal prosecution in a public official are summarized as follows: "Those
opposed to the threatened innovation [public prosecution] pointed to the experience of other
countries where, they charged, the control of the machinery for administering criminal
justice had fallen necessarily into the hands of political parties and was being used by
hordes of unscrupulous politicians to promote private or political ends. Private prosecu-
tions ... were infinitely preferable ... to an enforcement of the criminal law which made
the liberty of citizens dependent on the caprice or venom of party managers .... " HOWARD,
THE CONDUCT OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS IN ENGLAND [unpublished manuscript quoted
in MOLEY, POLITICS AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 201 (1929)].
131. QUESTIONNAIRE. See note 8 supra.
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